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Abstract 
In 2004 the UK Central Government announced merger of its two main central tax 
departments, the Inland Revenue, and HM Customs & Excise. The two big departments 
had different historical origins and administrative structures. Their organizational cultures 
were also perceived to be quite different. This paper considers the background of the 
merger and examines the rationale for such a merger with the help of textual data collected 
from in-depth interviews, official publications, and reports of the Treasury Select 
Committee. The paper also investigates the likely impact on practices and processes of the 
new department with regards to the taxpayers. Answers are sought with the help of insights 
drawn from New Institutional Sociology. The paper concludes with suggestions for future 
research. 
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1.  Introduction 
In March 2004, the U.K Government announced merger of its tax administration departments, the 
Inland Revenue (IR) and HM Customs and Excise (HMCE), following a report of a review of the two 
departments by the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Gus O’Donnell (Cm 6163, 2004). The two 
organisations had distinct historical origins and had remained separate government departments for 
many centuries. Most importantly, their organisational cultures were also perceived to be different. The 
event involving two of the biggest public sector organisations in the U.K went unnoticed by the 
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academic community. Already, Lamb and Lymer (1999) and Tomkins et al. (2001) lament the fact that 
tax regimes, despite their immense importance, receive very little attention from the academic 
researchers. Consequently, this paper not just analyses an important event in the history of the U.K’s 
public sector, but also makes a contribution towards filling an obvious gap in the academic literature. 
The paper is organised into six sections. In section 2, the research methodology adopted for this 
research endeavour is explained. In section 3, the two departments as they were before the merger are 
briefly introduced. In section 4, various views towards the merger are examined. In section 5, the post 
merger profile of the department as well as the initial views towards merger is analysed. In the 
concluding section the possible explanations of the merger are analysed and some future research 
possibilities are identified.  
 
 
2.  Research Methodology 
In the private sector, mergers and acquisitions of big companies take place quite regularly. At the 
elementary level, it can be argued that it is perceived by the shareholders of the two merged entities (or 
made to perceive so) that due to synergy creation they would be better off by parting with the old 
entities and creating a new one (Seth, 1990; Shaver, 2006). But, what may be the rationale behind 
merging two very big public sector departments where both have different historical origins and whose 
cultures are also generally believed to be different (if not conflicting at all)?  
NIS is an offshoot of the institutional theory. The writers of NIS (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell, 
1991, 1983; Pollit, 2002; Scott, 2001) provide an alternative view to the question as to why do 
organizations introduce changes? The conventional functionalist or rationalist explanations (e.g. 
agency theory, property rights theory, contingency theory and rational choice theory) take a 
sympathetic view towards the motives of the reformers (Pollit, 2002). The common feature of this 
category of theories is that they all explain a phenomenon in terms of intended results with a 
presumption that organizations change because such changes are necessitated by changes in the 
external environment. The NIS emerges as a competing theoretical lens whose essence is encapsulated 
by Scott (1987: p. 498)) who contends that organizations change: "…because they are rewarded for 
doing so through increased legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities".  
Earlier Meyer and Rowan (1977), in their seminal work, had popularised the potentially 
cosmetic nature of many organisational reforms. Broadbent and Laughlin, (1998) also show how 
organizations can skilfully decouple changes if the professionals feel that those changes could 
adversely affect their ethos of work. The various variants of institutional theory like ‘Old Institutional 
Economics’ (OIE), ‘New Institutional Economics’ (NIE) and ‘New Institutional Sociology’ (NIS) have 
their roots in different disciplines like economics, political science and sociology (Burns, 2000). This 
paper restricts its focus upon the process of isomorphism which DiMaggio and Powell (1983), referring 
to Hawley’s (1968) description, define as the process by which organizations tend to adopt the same 
structures and practices resulting in homogenization of organizations. Put briefly, the NIS authors 
identify the external pressures for reforms/change as ‘coercive isomorphism’ (the pressure comes from 
a superior organisation), ‘mimetic isomorphism’ (where an organisation, finding itself in doubt, copies 
what the perceived leaders of the field are believed to be doing) and ‘normative isomorphism’ (where 
an organisation, is heavily influenced by norms set by an external body) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 
1991). They also categorise two types of isomorphism: ‘competitive’ and ‘institutional’. Competitive 
isomorphism primarily relates to free and open market competition scenarios, and therefore, is not 
applicable to this analysis of public sector organizations. The other type is institutional isomorphism 
which relates to organizational competition for political power, social fitness, and institutional 
legitimacy and is therefore more relevant to this research study. We are mindful of the fact that the 
theory of isomorphism has been criticised and some authors (e.g. Oliver, 1991) have proposed 
modifications to the theory as well. However, like many other writers, we also find the notion of 
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‘isomorphism’ a useful theoretical lens to approach the issue of merger of two tax departments in the 
UK.  
This paper reviews and probes the governmental reasons cited in support of such a merger, and 
analyses the likely impact on practices and processes of the new department with regards to service 
delivery for taxpayers. Benefiting from the insights drawn from New Institutional Sociology (NIS), the 
paper evaluates the evidence in pursuit of finding answers to the following research question:  
“What are the plausible reasons for the merger of two big tax organizations in the U.K?” 
For the purpose of answering the research question, qualitative data was gathered through 
multiple sources of evidence to gain validity through triangulation (Yin, 1984). Interviews with the 
staff of IR and HMCE were held over a period of three years 2002-2004 to collect primary textual data. 
Fourteen interviews were held with the staff of IR and twenty interviews with the staff of HMCE 
before the announcement of merger in 2002-2003. The two interviews with tax partners of two big 
accounting firms took place in May and July 2005 after the merger had taken effect. The interviews 
were tape-recorded and transcribed. However, where the interviewees did not give permission for the 
interviews to be tape-recorded, detailed hand-written notes were taken. The coded references to the 
quotes of interviewees ensure the anonymity of the interviewees who had been very candid in their 
views and spoke in their personal capacities and not as spokespersons of the departments. The 
secondary textual data relating to the two departments was also analysed. First, parliamentary reports 
containing details of oral and written evidences before the members of parliamentary committees were 
perused for the period 1998-2004. They provided valuable insights into the viewpoints of senior 
management of the taxation departments. Second, the official publications of the Government, and 
National Audit Office (NAO) and press articles on relevant issues were also analysed. Third, the views 
expressed by taxation professionals (e.g. tax advisors) and tax bodies (e.g. CIOT) on publicly available 
resources such as websites, newsletters etc were also examined. The textual data collected from these 
diverse primary and secondary sources was then coded and the emerging themes were identified with 
the help of discourse analysis (Philips and Hardy, 2002) and insights drawn from NIS.  
 
 
3.  Profiles of the Merged Entities 
Before the merger, both IR and HMCE enjoyed executive agencies status with separate ‘Boards of 
Commissioners’ reporting directly to the Treasury department. In terms of tax collection, IR was 
responsible for collecting direct taxes (e.g. Corporation tax, Income tax, Capital Gains tax, etc) and 
HMCE administered indirect taxes (e.g. Value Added Tax (VAT), Custom duties, Excise duties on 
tobacco, alcohol and hydrocarbon oil besides other minor indirect taxes). The organisation was also 
responsible for anti-smuggling duties and provision of international trade statistics. The IR was also 
administering the tax credit scheme.  
The IR was the larger of two UK central government revenue departments, collecting almost 
two-thirds of UK tax revenues. Both of them were central government departments with long and 
distinguished histories, and both had been distinct departments of the UK government since distant 
past (Daunton, 2001, 2002; Hoon, 1968; Jones, 2005; Sabine, 1966). Prior to 1833 there were four 
separate Boards of Commissioners responsible for collecting different taxes in the UK. In 1833, first 
the separate boards of Stamps and Taxes were merged and then in 1849 the new organisation was 
combined with the board of Excise to form one single department: the ‘Inland Revenue’.  
HMCE was set up in 1909 when Excise was merged with the then Board of Customs (LSLO, 
2004). Though the department is younger in age, the revenue historians admit their inability to trace the 
exact origin of the ‘custom duties’, describing them to be levied from “time immemorial” (Atton and 
Holland, 1967). The personnel performing customs control duties are posted at airports, sea ports and 
land stations for regulating the UK’s import and export regimes. Anti-terrorism functions are the latest 
addition to multifarious roles performed by the department (HC 52, 2003). In addition to customs and 
excise duties, the major revenue spinner for HMCE is the VAT which was introduced in the U.K in 
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1973 as a requirement for membership to the then European Economic Community (Sandford et al., 
1981). Despite being the youngest of the three main indirect taxes, VAT accounts for 58% of the total 
tax receipts of HMCE.  
 
 
4.  From Cooperation to Merger 
As stated earlier, the two tax departments had different origins and worked independently for almost 
two centuries. However, since 1850s there emerged a view that called for greater cooperation between 
the two departments. The view was shared by the cabinet ministers of the central government, senior 
management of the two departments and members of the parliamentary committees. They, however, 
differed on the extent of cooperation between the two tax departments. The then extreme view 
favoured the merger of various Boards of taxes to form a single tax department. It can be argued that 
the IR historically supported the case for a merger, while the management of HMCE always held the 
opposite view1. This is evident from the following concluding remarks of the Royal Commission into 
the Civil Establishments in 1889- which heard evidence in respect of merger from the Board of the IR, 
several trade representatives and W. E. Gladstone, the former Prime Minister and Chancellor of the 
Exchequer;  
"we cannot say that any grievances have been proved before us which are the 
consequences of separate control, or any inconveniences established which cannot 
apparently be easily remedied by departmental improvements, and by some provisions 
for more united action on the part of the two Boards" (Parliament, 2000: Para 13). 
The relationship between the IR and HMCE again became an issue with the introduction of 
VAT (Cm. 5487). But the merger proposal again did not win favour with the then Government, and as 
a result ‘closer working between the two departments’ emerged as the official doctrine. The Finance 
Act 1972 even made explicit provision for the transfer of information between the two departments.  
The issue of merging the two departments, after remaining dormant for long, resurfaced in the 
wake of announcements of Fundamental Expenditure Reviews in 1993 (ibid: Para 13-35). A review of 
the second report of the TSC (Parliament, 2000) establishes that while various academics and 
representatives of professional firms such as PWC supported the idea of merger, the HMCE always 
raised strong opposition to the idea and instead pleaded for the then official doctrine of ‘closer working 
between the two departments’. For instance in a written memorandum, HMCE stated: 
"The possibility of merging Customs and the Inland Revenue was examined closely 
during the Fundamental Expenditure Review of 1994. The conclusion at that time was 
that, although a merger could produce savings in staffing, IT and accommodation, the 
short-term costs were likely to outweigh the efficiency gains. Instead, the previous 
Government put in hand the programme of closer working" (ibid: Para 16).  
The disapproval of the idea of merger was also found to be evident in the discourse of HMCE 
related personnel interviewed by the authors of this paper. Three main arguments against merger 
emerged from the detailed discussion held with them on the issue of merger. First, the different ways in 
which the two departments work is due to the different nature of the taxes they administer. For 
instance, one manager referred to this difference in the following way: 
“The VAT is a tax given to the businesses by the consumers for onward deposit with the 
national Kitty. Thus the businesses hold this amount of tax as a trustee, and if they do 
not deposit it they commit an act of theft. The direct taxes are different as the businesses 
contribute a portion of their own profits to the national treasury. Hence there is a room 
for negotiation and lesser stringent regime of penalties” (OLCE6: p10).  
Second, the time scale for completing audit work in the case of VAT is entirely different from 
that of direct taxes. For example, one manager refers to this legislative limitation as: 
                                                 
1 The second report of TSC (Parliament, 2000) outlines the history of merger efforts since 1862-63.  
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“…we look at things that are just gone; very current; if we discover things wrong in a 
VAT trader’s records which are more than three years old we cannot do anything about 
it; because it’s out of time. The IR does not even start looking at stuff until it is two 
years old, and, so these are some of the obstacles, some of the problems”. (MMCE1: 
p11) 
Third, this difference in nature of taxes and the time scale necessitates different set of legal 
powers for the two tax departments. A manager explains this in the following words: 
“… one of our biggest areas of checking credibility of the business is to actually go 
along to the business and actually look at the business; see it operating and look with 
your eyes and see what’s going on; the IR rarely do that so there is a difference” 
(MMCE1: p13). 
Based on these three strands of arguments, the respondents were sceptical of the need for a 
merger. For instance one manger explicitly argued: 
“…. all that’s going to change is that instead of having the dreaded VAT man and 
dreaded income tax inspector you have the dread tax man in general; I thought that 
much would change ” (MMCE4: p23). 
The manager also underscored the need for realising the mismatch between the needs of the two 
departments, as evidenced by closer working experiences. 
“We do have some successes in that area but we tried and put together some 
experiments of actually working closer with them on other areas and it just hasn’t 
worked; and that’s not because necessarily of the differing cultures” (MMCE1: p14).  
The issue of contrasting cultures emerged as an important issue in the discourse of a senior IR 
manager as well, prior to the merger. While welcoming the merger proposal, the interviewee thought 
that the merger would be a real challenge as there are different cultures and ethos in both organisations. 
According to his understanding the then Customs side of HMCE was very different from the then IR, 
as he thought that Customs could be very aggressive on the compliance side (SMIR1, 2004). 
Thus, it can be seen that the HMCE had historically opposed the idea of merger; a stance that 
was supported by successive governments as well. However, the parliamentary committees had always 
been advocating the case for a merger. In fact, the parliamentary committee spearheaded the campaign 
for a merger by expressing its lack of faith in the closer working alternative approach: 
“We agree wholeheartedly with the aims of the Closer Working programme but we do 
not believe that the Closer Working programme will fully achieve its objectives and 
deliver the benefits claimed by Customs and Excise. Consequently, the option of merger 
requires serious consideration” (Parliament, 2000: Para 34) 
The members of TSC even visited Canada where they studied the experience of merged tax 
administrations. They returned greatly impressed and the ‘mimetic pressure’ of following the perceived 
leaders is quite visible in the recommendations made by the TSC: 
“We believe that the merger of the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise would 
improve compliance with taxation, reduce businesses' compliance costs and reduce the 
Government's revenue collection costs and we recommend that such a merger should 
proceed and that the Government should bring forward a plan for the merger in 
accordance with our conclusions and recommendations in this Report” (ibid: Para 45). 
Till 2004, the government had been resisting these mimetic and normative pressures emanating 
from foreign tax administrations, TSC, OECD, professional tax bodies, and academics to merge the 
two tax departments with different historical origins.  
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5.  The Merger and the Post Merger Reactions 
Interestingly, the government finally capitulated and in complete reversal of its longstanding position 
on the issue, announced merger of the two tax departments in a report titled Financing Britain’s 
Future: Review of the Revenue Departments (Cm 6163, 2004) which was authored by Gus O’Donnell, 
the permanent secretary of Treasury and presented to the parliament by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Gordon Brown in March 2004. Reviewing the historical evolution of two separate tax 
departments in the U.K, the report dismisses its own longstanding position by arguing that due to 
separation the U.K had a structure of tax administration that “is now used only by Malawi and Israel” 
(ibid: p 5). Acting upon the report’s recommendations, the Government created a new department ‘Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ (HMRC) which came into existence on 18 April 2005 after the 
Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act received Royal Assent on 7 April 2005.  
One of the recommendations of the O’Donnell Report was that the new structure of the HMRC 
would be around ‘customers and functions rather than taxes’ (ibid: 24). This is a theme which is 
identifiable with the New Public Management (NPM) literature (Christensen and Laegrid, 1999; Hood, 
1995). The stated objective is reflected in the proposed structure of the new department which claims 
to have integrated activities of the two merged tax departments around customers or functions (Cm 
6542: p5). For instance, the departments of the two merged organisations looking after large businesses 
have been merged to give an integrated service to the large business entities which account for 55 % in 
value terms of taxes and duties (ibid: p12; HMRC, 2006). 2  
How have the external stakeholders reacted to the merger decision? The views can be 
categorised as those who subscribe to the rational choice/functionalist explanation, and those who 
share some degree of scepticism. The former do appreciate the decision of merging the two 
organizations while the latter view the move as an exercise in gaining legitimacy. The functionalist 
explanation can be succinctly laid down by referring to the foreword to O’Donnell report, where the 
chancellor cites three main categories of reasons for the merger plan. Those are: 
1. Efficiency savings 
2. Customer focus 
3. Greater accountability 
O’Donnell, (2004) in his lecture suggests that direct and indirect audit visits could be combined 
to ensure savings and customer focus. The efficiency argument is reiterated in the new department’s 
spring report and claims that savings would be made by reducing 3,200 full time equivalent posts (Cm 
6542: 46). The second category of benefits is claimed to be improvement in customer-focus. The emphasis 
on this objective can also be seen in the spring report of the new organization (Cm 6542: 6). The third main 
objective is claimed to be improvement of accountability. In the O’Donnell report a full chapter is devoted 
to the issue of accountability. Accountability is a complex notion and in the public sector it is often used 
without realising that it is chameleon in nature and may be defined differently by different stakeholders 
(Day and Klein, 1987; Roberts, 1991; Romzek and Dubnick, 1987). In the O’Donnel report, it is 
simply stated that by separating policy from implementation the accountability framework will be 
improved. Thus accountability has been viewed purely in its managerial sense. The merged 
                                                 
2 HMRC is organised into four areas. 
The ‘Process and Product groups’ which are concerned with the design, specification and advice of specific taxes and 
duties (e.g. VAT, Corporation tax, Excise and Stamp Taxes) and methods of particular collection procedures such as 
PAYE and Self Assessment.  
The ‘Customer units’ which have been split on the basis of size into Large Businesses and Employers; Small & Medium 
Enterprises and Employers; Individuals and Frontiers.  
A single ‘Operations unit’ will take the place of those operations previously dealt with by IR and HMCE separately e.g. 
there will be a single contact centre organisation and a single national banking and debt management function. There will 
also be a single ‘Client Relationship Manager’ for each of the large businesses on the basis of a common assessment of 
risk to the Exchequer.  
The ‘Corporate Functions’ which will look after Human resources, Communications and Anti-avoidance issues (Cm 
6542: 12). 
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departments had always remained responsible for the policy development of individual taxes and ‘care 
and management’ including the introduction of anti-avoidance legislation while the Treasury had a 
more holistic role over overall tax policy generally (Cm 6542: 99). Criticising such arrangements, the 
O’Donnel report refers to the views of various academics, IMF and OECD and stresses that the U.K 
should also adopt the international trend of more strategic administration built upon customer needs (p. 
40). Consequently, under the new measures, the Treasury is responsible for the direction and strategy 
of tax policy while HMRC is responsible for policy maintenance. The desire for greater accountability 
can also be seen from the fact that the ‘remit statement’ which is a letter addressed to the then 
Executive Chairman of the HMRC by the Chancellor of the Exchequer has been made publicly 
available (HM Treasury, 2005). However, it is worth remembering that due to confidentiality issues of 
taxpayer information, only the HMRC, and not the Treasury, has access to taxpayers’ data which may 
put a restraint on the Treasury’s ability to make policies on its own.  
The official explanation for the merger is, therefore, built upon three main arguments; savings, 
better customer-focus and improved accountability. An analysis of the comments made by the external 
stakeholders suggests that the official explanation did not win universal acceptance. No doubt, there 
were many who shared the enthusiasm of the Government as demonstrated by the reply of one 
interviewee from a large company that the merger would be mirroring what happens inside a number 
of in-house tax departments of companies which manage their tax exposure to both indirect and direct 
taxes together (SMC1, 2003). Similarly, according to one press report (The Financial Times, 14 May 
2004) the business community was in general found to be favouring the merger as it was believed that 
a ‘single department would greatly simplify the payment of taxes and duties’. However, there are many 
who like NIS theorists question the rationale of the merger. For instance, the Technical Department of 
the Chartered Institute of Taxation (CIOT, 2005) identifies four areas of concern. First, the difference 
in cultures of the two departments; second, the different statutory framework of powers; third, the 
significant work to be undertaken in converging the respective Departments’ legislation and fourth; 
lack of clarity on any reduction in compliance costs borne by businesses. The last concern is important 
as reduction in compliance costs is mentioned as a part of efficiency saving in the merger publication 
(Cm 6163, p 9). 
Gosling (2004) reviews various reactions to the merger and casts doubts on the efficiency 
savings argument by referring to the analysts who have identified risks associated with the plans of 
staff reductions. The customer focus argument is also viewed with suspicion as it is argued that the 
merger plan might dilute customer focus by not offering differentiated service. Andrews (2005: p. 14) 
also raises this concern and states that “individuals, particularly those at the bottom of the economic 
pile, would receive even less care and attention than had been the case before merger”. Same word of 
caution was also given by the then Chairman of the Tax Faculty of the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England & Wales, Mr Mark Lee in oral evidence before members of the Treasury Sub-
Committee: 
“We welcome it [merger], but very cautiously. We would prefer to see step changes 
rather than a revolution” (Parliament, 2004: Q125). 
An interviewee narrated an example of unintended consequences whereby the creation of single 
Client Relationship Manager (CRM) resulted in increased compliance burden on the company (SMC2, 
2005). 
From organisational perspective, as in any large merger in the private sector, there is a 
possibility of a jockeying for positions by senior HMRC officials, which may well be driven more by 
internal politics and personal ambitions than by the consideration of the corporate taxpayer and its 
specific circumstances. This is all the more important in view of the generally contrasting views of 
managers of HMCE and IR on the need of merger. 
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6.  Conclusion 
The official reasons (efficiency gains, customer focus and greater accountability) for the merger of two 
tax departments are at the heart of New Public Management (NPM) movement which advocates 
adoption of private sector managerial practices to improve the perceived inefficiency of the public 
sector (Hood, 1995; Christensen and Laegreid, 1999). Therefore it can be argued that the merger move 
was influenced by NPM ideals of making the public sector more customer-focused and accountable. 
The NIS inspired explanation, however, may view the merger with varying degree of suspicion. 
According to this viewpoint the basic reason for merger will be located in the NPM inspired mimetic 
(i.e. following others) and normative (i.e. following the norm) pressures upon the government. The 
repeated references to Canadian experience of merger and other OECD countries in the TSC reports 
and official publications can be cited as evidence of mimetic and normative pressures upon the 
government to follow the path of isomorphism. Pollit (2002) questions the taken for granted claim of 
NPM literature on convergence of policies and concludes that the claim of convergence can only be 
true for discursive stage and partly for decision stage. The merger of two tax departments can, 
therefore, be cited as evidence towards discursive and decision stages of NPM inspired convergence. 
Did the actual implementation and results of merger follow the contents of official discourse at the 
discursive stage? It is too early to provide a definite answer; however, this paper has established an 
observatory for the said purpose. If a follow up research in about three to five years time finds that the 
government has realised significant efficiency savings as a result of merger, this will prove the 
efficiency argument of merger. The customer-focus argument can be adjudged if HMRC is perceived 
as a more tax-payers friendly organisation than HMCE. Similarly, if both tax-payers and the 
government believe that the accountability of tax collectors has improved, this NPM favoured 
argument will also be backed by evidence. In that case the functionalist explanation of merger will 
survive the test of time. However, if the evidence fails to suggest that the officially claimed objectives 
had actually been realised then the NIS based theory of isomorphism will emerge as a more credible 
explanation for the merger of the two tax departments. 
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Notes 
Table: Abbreviations used in the paper for referring to interviewees  
 
SMC1  Senior Manager of a Company 
SMC2 Senior Manager of a Company 
SMIR1 Senior Manager of a Inland Revenue 
MMCE1 Middle Manager of HM Customs & Excise 
MMCE4: Middle Manager of HM Customs & Excise 
OLCE6: Operational level Official of HM Customs & Excise 
 
 
